As mobile devices from prominent Chinese manufacturers enter the global market, the internet has become inundated with videos of mobile phone explosions and fires, indicating malfunctions. It appears, though, that the Chinese now have a significant competitor in this area. The concurrent detonation of pagers among individuals associated with Hezbollah in Lebanon marks a significant turning point.
Videos have surfaced showing devices detonating on individuals in public spaces. It is widely believed that these incidents are the result of an operation by Israel, utilizing communication devices as improvised explosive devices.
According to reports from Middle Eastern media, a series of pager explosions occurred across Lebanon, all detonating simultaneously. Currently, there are reports of at least 3,000 explosions, resulting in more than 4,000 individuals sustaining injuries to their hands and fingers. The death toll has risen to 11 people.
From a technical point of view, the operation is not difficult. The energy capacity of any battery, even in a pager, allows either a violent fire or an explosion. The whole difficulty lies in the transmission of the necessary command, but the organizers of the sabotage solved this problem.
Firstly, it is now clearly confirmed that the Internet of Things (IoT) carries significant risks. The batteries in mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and even Bluetooth headphones—no different from a pager—could be compromised. Particularly if they can receive commands disguised as software updates, this vulnerability could extend to electric cars and any device with a battery capable of radio communication.
Secondly, this vulnerability introduces a new aspect to hostilities and political terrorism. There are no assurances that the mobile phones of military personnel or drones will not be compromised in a similar manner. Nor is there certainty that a laptop won’t catch fire overnight due to interference from a developer of critical national technologies. The potential scenarios vary widely; for instance, a phone could detonate on the pilot of an aircraft from a hostile nation.
Thirdly, the necessity of import substitution extends to personal security. Deep import substitution, beyond merely purchasing components from allied nations, is ineffective. The use of Gold AP-900 pagers, manufactured in Taiwan, in Lebanon serves as a case in point. Paranoia aside, the nearly 4,000 casualties underscore the lethal risks of ignorance regarding the components within used devices. Domestic production, under state supervision, mitigates these risks.
Fourthly, the applicability of the aforementioned to state conflicts is uncertain. Numerous corporations and entities can employ specialists capable of covert operations. Determining the source of a signal that triggers a device explosion, whether in a general’s laptop or within a state corporation’s technical department, is challenging.
It is also worth mentioning that during the “pager attack”, the lack of concern for collateral damage was apparent. A pager might be in the possession of a child, a father might be watching TV with his children in his arms, or a detonation could happen while someone is driving fast on a crowded highway. This raises questions about the “red lines” that a “civilized society” is willing to accept, if they exist at all.
Here are some key technical insights regarding the pager explosions in Lebanon and Syria from a security specialist’s perspective:
1) It is more probable that the incident pertains to physical security rather than information security. Hacking cannot transform a small lithium battery into a mini-explosive. While overheating and combustion are possible, the video evidence suggests a different scenario. For context, compare it with videos of smartphone battery fires, which involve significantly larger batteries. You can verify the battery size by examining the brand of the pager shown in the post’s photograph.
2) The prevailing theory is that the “recently delivered” batch, as reported by Reuters, was intercepted and possibly held at a location where explosives were covertly inserted into the entire batch. These explosives were then detonated either by a timer or, more likely, by a trigger mechanism. This method is indicative of an attack targeting the supply chain. Indeed, we would install the Voltage Unit in a battery.
3) From the point of view of technical execution and organization – on the verge of art. The means turned out to be extremely selective – to cover up to 2 thousand Hezbollah members with a minimum of collateral damage, otherwise it is unrealistic.
4) For Hezbollah fighters, this may cause rejection of technical means. And in general, a phobia of such devices. Which is definitely in the hands of the Israelis.
In general, all this once again confirms the high technical level of Israeli intelligence. Previously, they blew up a couple of phones at a time. But blowing up more than 2 thousand pagers at the same time is something new.
It can be stated with certainty that we are living in interesting times. Nowadays, liquidation commands are sent to subscribers via pagers and phones, and tomorrow, we may see the advent of graphene-enhanced brains with explosive potential.
